This paper examines the trends in court decisions involving hedonic damages as a follow up to an earlier survey of cases described by Ireland, Johnson and Taylor in a 1997 article. The trend continues to be against the admissibility of expert economic testimony on hedonic damages or other methods for placing dollar values on intangible losses. However, there have been a few successes for hedonic damage testimony that receive special attention in this paper. The paper also addresses special factors that apply to decisions in the states of New Mexico, Louisiana,
Introduction
In a 1997 paper, Walter D. Johnson, Paul Taylor and this author [Ireland, Johnson and Taylor, 1997;  henceforth IJT] provided a review of reported legal decisions regarding the admissibility of testimony by economic experts on hedonic damages since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in William Daubert et al v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (June 28, 1993) . 1 The focus of that paper had been on how judges viewed the hedonic damage concept from the standpoint of the Daubert tests for admissibility of "scientific" expert testimony. That paper also covered one immediately pre
Daubert case, Livingston v. U.S. (1993) to show that the Daubert decision represented a continuation of a trend in the federal courts toward closer examination of claims of scientific accuracy, particularly with respect to hedonic damage analysis. Appendix I of this paper provides a list of cases covered in IJT, including two 1996 decisions that were announced subsequent to the completion of the text and for which limited coverage had provided in the first footnote of that paper. The purposes of this paper are both to update that paper and to look at other issues in legal decisions regarding hedonic damages.
The Nature of the Lexis Search in this Paper
The basis of this paper is a Lexis search made during the month of November, 1999 using It is important to remember that only a small number of cases are "reported." The vast majority of state trial court decisions are not reported to any of the legal reference services, which means that they cannot be "found" in a search of the sort conducted for this paper. The following observations emerged from this survey of cases:
(1) The general trend is that hedonic damage testimony by economic experts continues to be rejected by the courts.
The IJT paper reviewed a total of 13 cases and included brief coverage of two additional cases in its first footnote. In all but two of those cases, the decision of the court was not to admit hedonic damage testimony by an economist. The two exceptions were both state court decisions in New Mexico, which also provided the only instance in the current search in which an economist was permitted to testify in a reported federal district court case.
The trend in the current search continues very strongly against hedonic damage testimony by an economist, particularly in federal courts. Among the 26 federal district court decisions found, 11 decisions involved the admissibility of economic testimony. Of the 11 cases, three were Louisiana cases, which do not hinge on narrowly scientific aspects of hedonic damage testimony, as was discussed in the previous section. One of those cases was the New Mexico case mentioned above, which will be discussed in the section on New Mexico law below. The other seven reported district court decisions rejected economic testimony by an economic expert on scientific grounds. Compared with the range of arguments presented in the IJT paper, no new ground was broken by the five of these decisions that were not included in IJT. None of the eight federal court of appeals decisions found in the current search involved admissibility of economic testimony by an economist.
The real magnitude of the problem in federal courts faced by proponents of hedonic damages is conveyed by two federal district court decisions that did involve any issue of hedonic damages. In the first, U. S. v. Starzepyzel (1995) Moreover, no one to our knowledge has been able to devise a formula by which the compensation for the loss of life can be determined with precision. Damages for this loss, like damages for pain and suffering, are too subjective to lend themselves to such exactness....Consequently, the trial court was correct in not permitting economic testimony to be used in computing loss of life damages. We rely heavily upon the jury and the trial court, who hear the testimony and weigh the facts, to reach a just result. While we might not have awarded the same amount of damages had we been the fact finder in this case, we cannot say that no reasonable person could have reached such a result.
(2) In spite of the general trend, there were a few qualified successes for proponents of hedonic damage testimony. To adequately discuss these qualified exceptions to the general trend against allowing hedonic damage testimony, it is important to understand the contexts within which these decisions were reached. This will result in reviewing earlier decisions to set the stage for the more recent decisions:
New Mexico. As was indicated above, the one federal case in which hedonic damage testimony was admitted was tried under New Mexico law. Thus, the legal context for that case are prior cases in New Mexico. In the IJT paper, there had been only two reported decisions after the Daubert decision in 1993 that suggested that hedonic damage testimony by an economist might be admissible. The first of these cases was Romero v. Byers (1994 Ingersoll-Rand (2000) . 3 In the district court decision, the federal judge ruled that the plaintiff's economic expert Stan Smith (no relationship to the plaintiff) could explain the concept of hedonic damages, but not present specific estimates of the loss suffered by the plaintiff. She also indicated in her opinion that Smith is a diversity action in which New Mexico law and not federal law is applicable. In light of that distinction, the judge then considered whether the Daubert standard applied in Smith and concluded that Daubert did not apply. She said:
Stan Smith would testify based upon economic studies that he has applied to a valuation of hedonic damages. This testimony is not one that requires the rigors of the scientific process; it falls into the category of social science, a discipline dealing with human behavior and societal values that does not easily lend itself to scientific evaluation. Stan Smith is a nonscientific expert whose credentials include substantial formal instruction in the technique of a discipline. See, e.g., Edward J. Ill. 1995) . This lack of reliability shows the potential for Stan Smith's valuation testimony to be both unhelpful and confusing to a jury. Thus, applying Rule 702 to the proposed testimony, the Court will not allow Stan Smith to place a value on Ron and Lucy Smith's hedonic damages.
The Court will not, however, completely exclude Stan Smith's testimony. Stan Smith can and should quantify for the jury, if appropriate, his opinion as to Ron Smith's loss of wages both as a function of an average work life and full time employment, and to the value of lost household services. Moreover, Stan Smith can also present his opinion as to the value of Lucy Smith's losses with respect to wages and household services. The Appeals Court then went on to cite a number of the cases discussed in the IJT paper and the current paper in establishing the validity of this characterization. It is to be noted that the 10 th Circuit Court of Appeals has even more recently upheld in Baron v. Sayre Memorial Hospital (July 24, 2000) a trial court judge's opinions based on difficulties in distinguishing between hedonic damages and other types of damages. The Baron decision involved an Oklahoma case in which a district court judge had admitted evidence of the plaintiff's criminal record as it related to an award for hedonic damages, but did not involve testimony by an economic expert on that subject. The Appeals Court in Baron quoted the district court decision that "it takes a discerning mind...to make a strict differentiation between hedonic damages as a separate category and the loss of pleasure of life as a pain and suffering--mental pain and suffering component..."
Montana. In Hunt v. K-Mart (1999) , the Supreme Court of Montana refused to overturn the trial court judge's decision to admit hedonic damage testimony. This case is interesting primarily in the degree of ineptitude of the attorneys for the defendant K-Mart. The Court refused to overturn the trial court's admission of hedonic damage testimony, saying:
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony regarding Norma's hedonic damages due to the lack of a timely and specific objection to the evidence at trial. Moreover, because the District Court did not err in allowing this evidence in the first instance, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying K-Mart's motion for a new trial on the grounds that the admission of evidence resulted in an unfair trial and excessive damages.
The defense had been notified of the plaintiff's intent to present hedonic damage testimony far in advance, but had failed to do any research in preparation for challenging this testimony at trial. The language of the Hunt Court appears to suggest that K-Mart might have prevailed with proper preparation to challenge the admissibility of hedonic damage expert testimony. The Hunt Court carefully documents this failure to prepare for challenge in its decision, pointing out that: K-Mart did not cite any legal authority to the District Court in support of its position that this kind of testimony is not allowable in the courts of Montana or elsewhere and, when asked whether it was aware of any professional articles attacking the approach used by Drs. Velin (the psychologist) and Vinso (the economist), K-Mart responded, 'Nothing that directly attacks it; no, Judge.'
Missouri. In Schuman v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission (1995) The Schuman Court said about the hedonic damage element in the appeal of the trial court decision:
We need not decide the issue because we find that even if it was error to allow Dr. Ward's testimony (fn 9) there was no prejudice to the Commission. As noted previously, Dr. Ward calculated Schuman's lost enjoyment of life damages at $496,249. This figure, of course, was being presented merely as an element of Schuman's general damages resulting from the injuries he sustained. It did not, nor was it intended to, comprise all elements of general damages. Yet the jury found only $191,000 in total damages, of which only 70% was attributable to the Commission, resulting in a net judgment to Schuman of $133,700 (and subsequently amended to the $100,000 cap).
In this context, footnote 9 is quite revealing. Mississippi. In K.M Leising, Inc. et al v. Butler (1999) , the Mississippi Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had not committed reversible error in admitting hedonic damage testimony by Stan Smith in a personal injury case. This was significant because it followed the Upchurch decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically disallowing hedonic damage testimony in a wrongful death case (discussed below). The Leising Court specifically addressed the Upchurch decision [at *23]:
We can find no Mississippi case directly on point on the question of whether loss of enjoyment of life is an element of damages in a survival personal injury action. The Mississippi Supreme Court confronted this issue in the wrongful death context in Upchurch v. Rotenberry, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 524, 96-C A-01164-SCT (Miss. Oct. 15, 1998 . While the teaching on the issue in wrongful death was obiter dictum, we nevertheless find the discussion helpful in the resolution of the issues before us.
The Leising Court then raises an issue (that will be discussed below in the section on the issue of "whole life") concerning whether an individual who is not conscious can suffer hedonic losses. The Leising Court indicates that [at *26]:
We read Upchurch narrowly to hold only that hedonic or loss of enjoyment damages are not allowable in a wrongful death action absent some evidence that the decedent suffered a debilitating injury which persisted for a period of time prior to death and that in a proper case, evidence of loss of enjoyment of life damages might be admissible.
Then [at *28] , the Court adds:
While the weight of authorities who have considered this issue have concluded that expert testimony is inadmissible, (fn 2) we chose here to pretermit the issue and hold, for the reasons discussed below, that the admission of Stan Smith's testimony was harmless error even if it should not have been allowed.
Footnote 2 provides a list of cases in which hedonic damage testimony was rejected and then also provides an even longer list in the Appendix to the case. The Court then goes on to argue that the amount of hedonic damages awarded in the case is justified by other evidence so that Smith's testimony, even if in error, did not prejudice the case in a way that would have warranted reversal of the trial court decision. The dissent to this decision written by Justice McMillin and joined by two other dissenting justices strongly argues that the admission of Smith's testimony should have been reversible error, providing an extended discussion of his reasons for believing that Smith's testimony was not scientifically accurate or reliable.
Ohio. In the current search, Ohio produced eight cases in response to the keyword "hedonic." That was two more than the second highest, which was six cases in Louisiana.
Nebraska had four cases, but no other state had more than two and only eighteen states had any at all. The first Ohio case ruled that hedonic damages were not available in a death case and hence that economic testimony could not be presented. The second, which will be discussed below, ruled that hedonic damages are not available to a person in a persistent vegetative state. The third case is the primary focus of this section. The fourth case was a "lost chance of survival case" in which testimony about lost earnings was allowed. The fifth case involved a grant of summary judgement. The sixth case was a legal malpractice case in which the court granted summary judgement. The seventh case mentioned a key underlying Ohio case, Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement (1992), but did not involve an economist. The eighth case ruled that hedonic damages were recoverable in a personal injury, but did not involve an economist.
In the third Ohio case, Lewis v. Alpha Lavel Separation, Inc. (1998) In Fantozzi, we observed that the "loss of ability to perform the plaintiff's usual functions" (i.e., loss of enjoyment of life) damages can be categorized as either "basic" or "hedonic" in form. "Basic losses" or disability losses include the inability to perform the basic mechanical body movements of walking, climbing stairs, feeding oneself and driving a car. 64 Ohio St.3d at 614-615, 597 N.E.2d 241 at 484. "Hedonic losses" include the inability to perform the plaintiff's usual specific activities which had given pleasure to this particular plaintiff, such as playing golf, dancing, bowling, playing musical instruments, and engaging in specific outdoor sports.
The Lewis court noted that the issue at hand was whether the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Brookshire's testimony. The court stated [at *10]:
. . .we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court's decision to admit Dr. Brookshire's testimony. Although we might have chosen to exclude Dr. Brookshire's testimony, we find nothing unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable with the trial court's decision to admit Dr. Brookshire's testimony . . . Appellant presented no evidence to prove that Dr. Brookshire's methodology was unscientific, not generally accepted, or otherwise unfirm.
We acknowledge that although appellant presented no evidence to prove that Dr. Brookshire's methodology was flawed, appellant cited various federal district court cases that excluded willingness-to-pay hedonic damages testimony by Stan Smith, an economist who had apparently co-authored Economic/Hedonic Damages: The Practice Book for Plaintiff and Defense Attorneys (1990) with Dr. Brookshire....
The Court then cited a number of those cases and added:
We also agree that these cases provide cogent reasons for excluding Dr. Brookshire's testimony in the case sub judice.... The Court discussed those "cogent" reasons at length before repeating:
Once again we note that although we agree with appellant that the above cases provide cogent reasons for excluding Dr. Brookshire's testimony, we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court's decision in the case sub judice to admit Dr. Brookshire's testimony. We cannot say that the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. We find that the evidence in question falls into the "shaky but admissible" category of evidence envisioned in Daubert.
The Lewis Court seemed to go out of its way to indicate that it would not have admitted Dr. Brookshire's hedonic damage testimony, that it considered such testimony "shaky," but that the shakiness did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion that would have warranted overturning the decision under a Daubert standard. While this was hardly a ringing endorsement, it was the first time in any case that any Court had ruled in a reported decision that hedonic damage testimony could pass a Daubert test, even on a "shaky" basis.
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(3) The legal definition of hedonic damages is no longer tied to economics.
It is important to understand the specific meaning of the term "hedonic" in the context of this search. Only one of the cases mentioned above was based on a use of the word "hedonic" other than in the context of "hedonic damages." This was a federal court of appeals decision involving use of an hedonic price index that had nothing to do with the personal loss of enjoyment of any human being. Stan Smith's use of the term "hedonic damages" in Sherrod v. Berry (1984 , 1988 has made "hedonic damages" a term of art that serves in place of "loss of the enjoyment of life."
7 Both federal and state courts now appear to treat "hedonic damages" and "loss of the enjoyment of life" as equivalent terms. (Ohio also refers to the same phenomena as "loss of the ability to perform life's usual functions.") One of the ironies involved in this adoption of "hedonic damages" as a term of art in law is that courts regularly have ruled that hedonic damages are recoverable in personal injuries. However, in most legal venues expert economic testimony about the magnitude of those damages is not admissible. Thus an economist cannot testify about a type of damages for which the legal community uses a term invented by an economic expert.
Occasionally, "hedonic damages" is even used as a synonym for "intangible damages,"
encompassing any type of loss that involves human emotions. In this broader usage, "pain and suffering," "loss of love and affection," and loss of consortium would all be included as types of "hedonic damages." Stan Smith has used the same basic methodology he uses for "loss of enjoyment of life" to measure the "loss of society" of other claimants with the injury or death victim. One clear implication of the current search is that hedonic damages is now a synonym for any type of measurement of life enjoyment, whether it involves the "willingness-to-pay" methodology or some other methodology. In most of the cases reviewed, the term "hedonic damages" or "hedonic losses" did not involve any issue of admitting economic testimony or any reliance on the "value of life" literature. The IJT paper failed to draw important distinctions between three quite different judicial rationales for rejecting hedonic damage testimony. First, many of the decisions discovered in this search are, in fact, rulings that hedonic damages may not be recovered, thus rendering moot the issue of whether or not an economist can testify about them. Second, even when hedonic damages may be recovered, state law often prohibits expert testimony of any kind about them.
Third, many courts have ruled that measurements of lost enjoyment derived from the willingnessto-pay/value of life literature are scientifically inaccurate for measuring those losses. Thus, even if the damages are recoverable and expert testimony about those damages is admissible, economic expert testimony about lost enjoyment of life or lost society based on the willingness-to-pay methodology and/or the value of life literature is inadmissible. Each of these rationales will be discussed further below. The court recognizes that there is measurable value to one's life other than his or her earning capacity. However, this value is already recoverable in the recognized category of mental suffering. There is no need to allow for the recoupment of hedonic damages as a separate category of loss.
Likewise, in Upchurch v. Rotenberry (1998) , the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the trial court judge's decision that "no expert testimony was necessary to 'lend any assistance to the jury's function in arriving at that figure,' and that the testimony would be 'speculative in nature.'"
There is a scientific line of reasoning behind this second approach, but it is a quite different line of reasoning than the third more specific Daubert rationale for denying expert testimony on cases was fully developed in the IJT paper and will not be repeated here. This is, however, the type of rejection that has been involved in all reported federal cases rejecting hedonic damage testimony by economists and most state cases as well.
(5) There is almost no mention of deterrence issues in any of the legal decisions involving hedonic damages.
In the literature of law and economics, the twin goals of tort law are to provide efficient incentives for protecting human lives and to provide efficient insurance protections for tort victims. A good sample of such discussion in law and economics can be found in Richard
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law (1998) 10 , a commonly used textbook for law and economics.
From Posner's perspective, the primary role of the tort system is to provide adequate incentives for the protection of property rights, including human lives. Since the "value of life" literature is designed to measure the "efficient" incentive value for the protection of human life, Posner might advocate that awards in wrongful death actions contain special "life loss" values to provide greater incentives for precautionary behavior. Posner, however, avoids being clear on this issue.
Others, particularly Steven Shavell [1987] , suggest that another function of the tort system is to provide insurance coverages to tort victims in an efficient manner.
Whether or not tort awards are efficient ways to provide for efficient protection of human lives or provides for insurance for tort victims in an efficient manner are not issues that arise in hedonic damage cases, either in the current search or in previous searches. The standard for legal decisions depends on two factors:
(1) what types of losses are recoverable by whom in what types of cases; (2) the "make whole" principle the underlies tort law, but which often does not even provide "efficient compensation" from the standpoint developed by Steven Shavell [1987] and others. There seems to be no question that tort law is organized around the "make whole"
principle--regardless of efficiency considerations.
(6) The consciousness of an injured plaintiff is an important issue in whether or not hedonic damages may be awarded.
Most states appear to have requirements that consciousness is a requirement for the recovery of hedonic damages. Thus, an injury victim who is still alive must have remained conscious to recover for hedonic damages in personal injury cases. That was an issue of relevance in the Upchurch decision in Mississippi in a death case. Since a death precludes consciousness, hedonic damages were not permitted. It was also relevant in an Ohio Appeals Court decision in Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (1998) . In the Watkins case, the plaintiff could not recover hedonic damages because she was in a persistent vegetative state. This was also an issue in Ramos v. Kuzas (1992) . Some of these cases settled before trial and some were later reversed, like Sherrod, for other reasons than admissibility of hedonic damages. This list omits two or three cases in which Smith's testimony was initially admitted, but was later rejected on appeal. While unreported cases have no precedential value, it is clear that some judges have been willing to admit hedonic damages testimony in a number of states over the period of the past sixteen years. Because these cases were not reported, they would not turn up in a LEXIS search.
3.This decision was reached after this paper was initially presented at the Allied Social Sciences meetings in Boston in January, 2000 and was therefore not included in earlier versions of this paper. The even more recent decision of the 10 th Circuit Court of Appeals in Baron v. Sayre Memorial Hospital discussed in the text was also not included in the earlier paper. that held that consciousness was a prerequisite for an award of hedonic damages.
General Conclusion
In reported decisions, judges have generally not looked with favor on the hedonic damage concept. This has particularly been true since the Daubert decision in 1993. However, there have been a few successes of the concept in recent years and there is no reason to suppose that this issue will disappear in the near future. In the meantime, the attempts of both the courts and forensic economists to deal with this issue has been a source of very useful analysis.
Endnotes
4.The Schuman case was not discussed in the IJT paper because the issues in Schuman did not involve judicial commentary on the scientific merits or a direct admissibility of hedonic damages. However, it was known to IJT at the time that paper was written, unlike other cases discussed in this section of the current paper.
5.It is interesting to note that the specific ruling in Ramos was that "because a newborn injured in utero or at birth has not had adequate time to develop the ability to perform a pleasurable activity or hobby specific to his or her lifestyle, a newborn cannot suffer hedonic damages." 6.In this context, it is important to remember that the New Mexico federal district court decision in Smith v. Ingersoll Rand (1997) involved a judicial determination that Daubert did not apply to New Mexico law and that therefore Stan Smith's "non scientific" testimony could be admitted in a diversity action in a federal court in New Mexico under New Mexico law.
7. Indeed, one Ohio case found in this search did not even contain the word "hedonic" but did contain reference to "enjoyment of life." This means that Lexis is set up to recognize "enjoyment of life" and "hedonic damages" as closely related concepts.
8.The Illinois legislature went one step further and passed a law stating that "there shall be no recovery for hedonic damages" in Illinois. See here the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Best v. Taylor Mach. Works (1997) . In this decision, the Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court decision consistent with the new Illinois law.
9.In the IJT paper, three of the cases listed as rejecting hedonic damage testimony by an economist were Louisiana cases following this line of reasoning. The underlying precedent for those three cases, for three federal district court cases in Louisiana and four six state cases in the current search is a pre Daubert 1992 ruling of the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Foster v. Trafalgar House of Oil and Gas (1992) , which said: "any evidence, including expert testimony, that attempts to quantify or assign a specific monetary value for alleged loss of the pleasure of life (hedonic damages) is inadmissible." 10. pp. 208-219.
